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HUMECU KURGUCULUĞUN KENDİLİKSİZ BİLİŞ ANLAYIŞI

Year 2023, Issue: 77, 152 - 180, 06.08.2023
https://doi.org/10.58634/felsefedunyasi.1297617

Abstract

Geleneksel bilişselci yaklaşımlar, algılama, akıl yürütme ve hafıza gibi bilişsel süreçlerin gerçekleşmesini olanaklı kılan, arka planda özdeş ve bütünleşik bir zihnin varlığını ön dayanak haline getirirler. Deneyci ve natüralist bir perspektiften bilişselliği anlayan David Hume’un insan doğasına dair görüşleri, bu geleneği bozarak, özdeş ve bütünleşik bir zihnin varlığı olmadan da bilişsel etkinliğin gerçekleşebileceğini kanıtlar. Hume’un kanıtlamasının merkezinde, bedenin iç ve dış dünyalara dair öz-duyumsamalarının sağladığı çekime tekabül eden duygulamlar vardır. Bedenin duygulanımları, algılama sürecini anlamlı hale getiren çerçeveyi çizer. Ancak, duygulamların bilişsel süreçlerin merkezinde olduğunu gösterebilmek için zihin-beden ikiliği terminolojisini aşmak gerekir. Bu çalışma, Hume’un epistemolojik kurgucu olduğunu iddia ederek, zihin-beden ikiliği terminolojisini kullanmanın natüralizmi üzerindeki olumsuz etkilerini bertaraf etmeyi ve ontolojik kurguculuğunu çağdaş bilişsel bilimlerle diyaloğa sokarak yeniden ele almayı hedefler. Bu amaçla, birinci bölümde, Hume’un epistemolojik ve ontolojik iki yoldan kurgucu olduğu iddia edilmiş ve Hume’un töz ve nitelik ikicisi olmadığı gösterilerek bu iki kurguculuk biçiminin de kavramsal zemini açımlanmıştır. İkinci bölüm, üst-düzlem bilişsel süreçlerin zihin terminolojisinden arındırılmış bir dille Humecu perspektiften açıklamayı deneyerek, zihne dair dile yerleşik düşünce metaforlarını sorgular. Son olarak, Humecu perspektif çağdaş bilişsel kuramlarla diyaloğa sokularak, arka planda bütünleşik bir algılayıcının varsayılmasına gerek duyulmadan, bilişselliğin dinamik, konumlu ve bedenli yapısının imkânı tartışılmıştır. Sonuç olarak, Humecu perspektiften, izlenim ve tasarım olarak algılama süreci, temsiller gibi bir aracıya ve tüm bilişsel süreci değerlendirici işleviyle kontrol edecek bütünleşik bir zihne ihtiyaç duymadan, bedenin duygulanımsal geri bildirim sistemlerine bağlı olarak geliştiği gösterilmiştir.

References

  • Ainslie, D.C. (2022). Hume’s Bundle. Hume on the Self and Personal Identity. Ed. Dan o’Brien. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 21–47.
  • Armstrong, D. M. (1999). The Mind Body Problem. Taylor and Francis Group.
  • Beer, R. D. (2000). Dynamical Approaches to Cognitive Science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(3), 91–99.
  • Cummins, P. D. (1995). Hume as Dualist and Anti-Dualist. Hume Studies Volume XXI, Number 1:47-56.
  • Fodor, J. A. (2003). Hume Variations. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
  • Froese, T. (2009). Hume and the Enactive Approach to Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):95-133.
  • Gopnik, A. (2009). Could David Hume Have Known about Buddhism?: Charles François Dolu, the Royal College of La Flèche, and the Global Jesuit Intellectual Network. Hume Studies 35(1):5-28.
  • Kalderon, M. (2005). (Ed). Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Locke, J. (1999). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Nidditch, P. [ed.] The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke, Oxford University Press.
  • Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Johnson Metaphors We Live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  • Hume, D. (2009). İnsan Doğası Üzerine Bir İnceleme. Çev. Ergün Baylan. Bilgesu Yayınları. Kemp Smith, N. (1905). The naturalism of Hume (I.). Mind, 14(54), 149–173.
  • McCarthy, J; P.J. Hayes (1969). "Some Philosophical Problems from the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence". Machine Intelligence. 4: 463–502.
  • McCulloch, W. & W. Pitts. (1943). A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, 5:115-133.
  • Stroud, B. (1977). Hume. New York, NY: Routledge.
  • Strawson, G. (2022). What I Call Myself. Hume on the Self and Personal Identity. Ed. Dan o’Brien. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 47-85. Strawson, G. (2016). Hume on Personal Identity. The Oxford Handbook of Hume, ed. P. Russell. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 269–92.
  • Varzi, A. C. (2013). Fictionalism in Ontology. From Fictionalism to Realism. Ed. Carola Barbero vd. Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 133-151.
  • Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
  • Van Gelder, T. (1998). The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,21(5),615–665.
  • Van Gelder, T., & Port, R. F. (1995). It’s about time: An Overview of the Dynamical Approach to Cognition. In R. F. Port, & T. van Gelder (Eds.), Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1–43.

THE VIEW OF SELFLESS COGNITION IN HUMEAN FICTIONALISM

Year 2023, Issue: 77, 152 - 180, 06.08.2023
https://doi.org/10.58634/felsefedunyasi.1297617

Abstract

Traditional cognitivist philosophies presuppose the existence of an identical and unified mind as a background which enables cognitive processes such as perception, reasoning, and memory. Hume’s view on human nature that conceptualizes cognition from an empiricist and naturalist perspective breaks this tradition and proves the possibility of cognitive activity without an identical and unified mind. Affects lie at the core of his argumentation, which correspond to bodies’ self-sensations from within and outside the body. Bodily affections draw the frames which make the process of perception meaningful. However, in order to show that affects are at the center of cognitive processes, it is significant to overcome the terminology of body-mind dualism. This study aims to eliminate negative effects of using the terminology of mind-body duality in Hume’s naturalism by asserting his epistemological fictionalism, and also reexamine his ontological fictionalism by associating it with contemporary cognitive science. For this aim, in section one, it is asserted that Hume is an epistemological and ontological fictionalist in two ways and the conceptual framework of his fictionalisms is explained by showing that that he is not a substance or property dualist regarding mind-body dualism. The section two attempts to account for higher-order cognitive processes through Hume’s perspective which is devoid of terminology of mind and questions the related metaphors of thought build within language use. In the last section, the possibility of dynamic, situated, and embodied cognition without the background of a unified perceiver is argued by associating Hume’s perspective with contemporary theories of cognition. As a result, from Hume’s perspective, it is shown that the process of perception as impressions and ideas occur by bodies’ affective feedback systems without mediation of representations and a unified mind as a controlling mechanism of all cognitive processes.

References

  • Ainslie, D.C. (2022). Hume’s Bundle. Hume on the Self and Personal Identity. Ed. Dan o’Brien. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 21–47.
  • Armstrong, D. M. (1999). The Mind Body Problem. Taylor and Francis Group.
  • Beer, R. D. (2000). Dynamical Approaches to Cognitive Science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(3), 91–99.
  • Cummins, P. D. (1995). Hume as Dualist and Anti-Dualist. Hume Studies Volume XXI, Number 1:47-56.
  • Fodor, J. A. (2003). Hume Variations. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
  • Froese, T. (2009). Hume and the Enactive Approach to Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):95-133.
  • Gopnik, A. (2009). Could David Hume Have Known about Buddhism?: Charles François Dolu, the Royal College of La Flèche, and the Global Jesuit Intellectual Network. Hume Studies 35(1):5-28.
  • Kalderon, M. (2005). (Ed). Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Locke, J. (1999). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Nidditch, P. [ed.] The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke, Oxford University Press.
  • Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Johnson Metaphors We Live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  • Hume, D. (2009). İnsan Doğası Üzerine Bir İnceleme. Çev. Ergün Baylan. Bilgesu Yayınları. Kemp Smith, N. (1905). The naturalism of Hume (I.). Mind, 14(54), 149–173.
  • McCarthy, J; P.J. Hayes (1969). "Some Philosophical Problems from the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence". Machine Intelligence. 4: 463–502.
  • McCulloch, W. & W. Pitts. (1943). A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, 5:115-133.
  • Stroud, B. (1977). Hume. New York, NY: Routledge.
  • Strawson, G. (2022). What I Call Myself. Hume on the Self and Personal Identity. Ed. Dan o’Brien. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 47-85. Strawson, G. (2016). Hume on Personal Identity. The Oxford Handbook of Hume, ed. P. Russell. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 269–92.
  • Varzi, A. C. (2013). Fictionalism in Ontology. From Fictionalism to Realism. Ed. Carola Barbero vd. Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 133-151.
  • Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
  • Van Gelder, T. (1998). The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,21(5),615–665.
  • Van Gelder, T., & Port, R. F. (1995). It’s about time: An Overview of the Dynamical Approach to Cognition. In R. F. Port, & T. van Gelder (Eds.), Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1–43.
There are 19 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language Turkish
Subjects Philosophy
Journal Section Research Article
Authors

Ayşe Uslu Pooyanı 0000-0002-3144-4195

Publication Date August 6, 2023
Submission Date May 16, 2023
Published in Issue Year 2023 Issue: 77

Cite

APA Uslu Pooyanı, A. (2023). HUMECU KURGUCULUĞUN KENDİLİKSİZ BİLİŞ ANLAYIŞI. Felsefe Dünyası(77), 152-180. https://doi.org/10.58634/felsefedunyasi.1297617